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This study investigates whether exchange rate flexibility aids real exchange rate adjustment 
based on intra-period data on dual exchange rates from developing countries. Specifically, it 
analyzes whether the flexible parallel market rate produces faster or slower real exchange rate 
adjustment than the much less flexible official rate does. Half-life estimates of adjustment 
speeds are obtained using fractional time series analysis. We find no systematic evidence that 
greater exchange rate flexibility tends to produce faster or slower real exchange rate 
adjustment, albeit there is substantial heterogeneity in speed estimates across countries. With 
officially pegged exchange rates, developing countries often use parallel exchange markets as 
a back-door channel to facilitate real exchange rate adjustment, but the empirical evidence 
suggests that these parallel markets in most cases fail to help promote real rate adjustment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  The role of exchange rate flexibility in economic adjustment has long been a hotly contested 
issue.  Nurkse (1944) concludes from interwar experience that speculative exchange rate 
movements amplify and prolong disequilibria rather than accelerate economic adjustment.  Such 
sentiment led to the postwar system of pegged rates under the Bretton Woods (BW) agreement.  
In contrast, Friedman (1953) contends that it is easier for the economy to adjust to shocks by 
securing needed changes in the real exchange rate through exchange rate than through price 
adjustment.  Instead of fearing the instability flexible rates might bring, Friedman suggested that 
speculative movements would actually quicken exchange rate adjustment and hasten its 
equilibrating process.  As the BW arrangement grew increasingly strained with currency crises in 
the late 1960s, many economists began advocating greater exchange rate flexibility. 
  Since the move to the current float, real exchange rates seem to have grown more persistent.  
Rogoff (1996) points out that the observed speed of real exchange rate adjustment is puzzlingly 
slow under the current float.  The implication that exchange rate flexibility can actually slow 
down rather than speed up real exchange rate adjustment casts doubt on the equilibrating 
function of the nominal exchange rate. 
  The issue then arises as to whether greater exchange rate flexibility promotes real exchange 
rate adjustment.  Previous empirical results based on cross-period comparisons are far from self-
evident.  On one end, the inter-period difference in persistence may suggest that real shocks are 
more significant in the post-BW than in the BW period.  Under this interpretation, the change in 
real exchange rate persistence is a result more of the historical period than of the nominal 
exchange rate regime (Grilli and Kaminsky, 1991).  At the other end, the rise in real exchange 
rate persistence under floating rates can be viewed as evidence that greater exchange rate 
flexibility undermines rather than promotes real exchange rate adjustment.  According to this 
view, speculative forces may send the nominal exchange rate temporarily off its equilibrating 
path.  Consequently, exchange rate fluctuations not only introduce an extraneous source of 
variability but also decelerate the process of real exchange rate adjustment.
1 
                                                      
1 Recent studies by Engel and Morley (2001) and Cheung et al. (2004) find that the glacial speed of real exchange 
rate adjustment may come largely from slow nominal exchange rate adjustment rather than from slow price 
adjustment.  The finding raises question about the facilitating role typically expected from nominal exchange rate 
adjustment.  
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  These opposing interpretations underscore a basic problem with cross-period comparison 
analysis.  Different historical periods can differ not only in the exchange rate regime but also in 
international events (such as oil crises) and domestic economic conditions.  Unless the statistical 
analysis can fully control for all relevant inter-period differences in both global and domestic 
economic conditions, it is difficult to determine in cross-period analysis the true extent to which 
the change in exchange rate flexibility is responsible for the observed change in the real 
exchange rate adjustment speed. 
  In this study, we do not analyze exchange rate flexibility in usual terms of exchange rate 
regimes (floating as opposed to fixed), but in terms of dual exchange rates (market-determined as 
opposed to government-set) from developing countries.  The former approach requires cross-
period analysis, whereas the latter permits within-period analysis.  Moreover, for many 
developing countries, the official exchange rate regime classification can be misleading in the 
presence of dual exchange rates, which make it less than straightforward to determine the true de 
facto regime (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
  This study provides evidence from dual exchange rate systems on the issue in whether 
exchange rate flexibility aids real exchange rate adjustment.  Not only during the BW period but 
also afterwards, parallel markets for foreign exchange – especially for the U.S. dollar – were 
common among developing countries.  Unlike the official rate, which is fixed and occasionally 
reset by the relevant monetary authority, the parallel rate is determined by market demand and 
supply.  With limited access to the official exchange market, the parallel market serves to meet 
unsatisfied demand for foreign currency.  Many developing countries use the dual exchange rate 
system as a tool to stabilize the real economy and to insulate real economic activity from the 
volatility of financial markets (Pozo and Wheeler, 1999).  As noted by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), parallel exchange rates provide a form of “back-door” floating in a lot of countries where 
an official peg is adopted. 
  The spread between the parallel and the official exchange rate – referred to as the parallel 
market premium – often works as an indicator of exchange rate misalignments and has been used 
as a guide to realigning the official rate.  According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), the parallel 
exchange rate is “a far better barometer of monetary policy than is the official exchange rate” 
and that the parallel market premium often correctly predicts realignments in the official rate and 
anticipates future official rate changes.  Earlier studies of the parallel market premium  
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(Dornbsuch et al., 1983; Kamin, 1993; Monteil and Ostry, 1994; Pozo and Wheeler, 1999) also 
suggest an important role for the expectations of future official rate changes in driving the 
premium.  Ghei and Kamin (1999) recognize that the parallel exchange rate is a good, though not 
entirely perfect, proxy for the free-market currency value. 
  To examine whether greater exchange rate flexibility leads to quicker real exchange rate 
adjustment, this study analyzes data on dual exchange rates for 24 developing countries.  For 
each of these countries, a parallel market for foreign exchange exists alongside the official one 
during both BW and post-BW periods.  With official and parallel rates being available for the 
same historical period, this special data set permits intra-period analysis.  We can evaluate he 
relative adjustment speed of the real official and the real parallel rate for each country within a 
given time period.  This minimizes the need to control for any inter-period differences in 
economic conditions.  Two questions of interest are:  Do the official and the parallel market rate 
revert toward one another over time?  Does the flexible parallel market rate imply a faster speed 
of real exchange rate adjustment than the less flexible official rate? 
  In addition to analyzing the difference in adjustment speed between real official and parallel 
rates on a country-by-country basis, this study also shows that the speed of adjustment for either 
rate can vary considerably across countries, even within the same historical period.  A cross-
section analysis will be conducted to evaluate how much the cross-country variation in 
adjustment speeds is attributable to structural differences in the underlying economies. 
  
2. Empirical Methodology 
 
  The adjustment dynamics of economic processes will be evaluated based on fractional time 
series models.  Fractional processes can exhibit a wide variety of adjustment dynamics, not 
captured by standard time series models (Diebold et al., 1991; Cheung and Lai, 1993).  Indeed, 
these processes provide a better approximation to the Wold decomposition of time series 
dynamics than conventional processes (Granger and Joyeux, 1980; Hosking, 1981).  Fractional 
processes are in general represented by 
   B(L)(1 – L)
dyt = D(L)vt (1) 
where yt is the time series under consideration, L is the standard lag operator, B(L) = 1 – β1L –  
… – βpL
p, D(L) = 1 – δ1L –  … – δqL
q, all roots of B(L) and D(L) are stable, vt is the random error  
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term, and the fractional differencing part is   
   (1  –  L)
d =  ∑
∞
= − Γ + Γ
− Γ





L d m  (2) 
with Γ( · ) being the gamma function.  This model describes a broad class of time series 
processes known as autoregressive fractionally integrated moving-average (or ARFIMA(p, d, q)) 
processes.  It extends the standard ARMA(p, q) and ARIMA (p, 1, q) models by permitting non-
integer values of d.  Such extended flexibility in modeling dynamics can be important for a 
proper evaluation of economic adjustment.  The long-run reversion property of yt is determined 
by the fractional integration parameter, d.  Cheung and Lai (1993) show that mean reversion 
occurs so long as d < 1. 
  In our statistical analysis, a frequency-domain maximum likelihood procedure is used to 
estimate the ARFIMA(p, d, q) model.  Following Fox and Taqqu (1986), we utilize the property 
that maximizing the likelihood function is asymptotically equivalent to: 
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with λk = 2πk/T and i being the imaginary part of the complex number.  Specifically, I y(λk) gives 
the periodogram of yt at the kth Fourier frequency, and f y(λk, ξ) is proportional to the spectral 
density of yt at frequency λk.  The resulting estimator for d is consistent and has an asymptotic 
normal distribution (Tanaka, 1999).  Cheung and Diebold (1994) show that this maximum 
likelihood procedure for estimating fractional processes has good finite-sample properties. 
 
3. Preliminary analysis on the parallel market premium 
 
  Before analyzing the relative adjustment speed of the real official and the real parallel 
exchange rate, we first address some known issues concerning the behavior of the parallel 
market premium.  Let eOt and ePt be, respectively, the official and the parallel market rate in 
logarithms.  The parallel market premium is given by ePt – eOt.  Although infrequently done, a  
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monetary authority may adjust the official rate to reduce currency misalignments.  If the parallel 
market premium is a good gauge of the degree of misalignment and a useful guide for setting the 
official rate, the official and parallel rates should not drift too far apart.  It follows that a long-run 
stationary relationship likely exists between these two rates.  Theoretical models – including 
portfolio balance models (Dornbusch et al, 1983; Phylaktis, 1991) and monetary models 
(Phylaktis, 1996; Kouretas and Zarangas 1998) – also suggest the parallel market premium be 
stationary. 
  The parallel market premium may also reflect part of the deviation from purchasing power 
parity (PPP).  To illustrate, we consider a simple variant of the parallel exchange rate models 
discussed by Kouretas and Zarangas (1998) and Diamandis (2003), under which both financial 
and goods arbitrages take place in the parallel foreign exchange market.  All the model variables 
are in logarithms.  Financial arbitrageurs exploit any divergence between the official and the 
parallel market rate, and their net supply of foreign exchange in the parallel market is described 
by 
   SPt = θ0 + θ1(ePt – eOt),  θ1 > 0  (6) 
where ePt is the parallel market rate and eOt is the official rate (all expressed as domestic currency 
per US dollar).  This indicates that as the parallel market premium increases, so does the profit 
incentive to meet demand for foreign exchange in the parallel market.  Goods arbitrages, on the 
other hand, are carried out based on the differential between the foreign price (pFt) and the 
domestic price (pDt).  Since demand for foreign exchange rises as foreign goods become cheaper 
relative to domestic goods, the net demand for foreign exchange from goods arbitrageurs in the 
parallel market is specified as 
   DPt = ζ0 + ζ1(pDt – ePt – pFt ), ζ1 > 0  (7) 
where pDt – ePt gives the domestic price in foreign currency units (i.e., in U.S. dollars).  At 
market equilibrium (i.e., when SPt = DPt), equations (A.1) and (A.2) combine to yield the 
following condition: 
   ePt – eOt = ϕ0 + ϕ1(ēt – eOt)      (8) 
where ϕ0 = (ζ0 – θ0)/(θ1 + ζ1), ϕ1 = ζ1/(θ1 + ζ1), and ēt = pDt  – pFt is the PPP-implied equilibrium 
rate.  To the extent that PPP prevails in the long run, the parallel market premium, ePt – eOt, is 
stationary, implying the existence of a long-run equilibrium relation between ePt and eOt. 
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Table 1.  The mean absolute size of nominal exchange rate movements* 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
            Bretton Woods        Post-Bretton Woods   
Country  Official rate  Parallel rate  Official rate  Parallel rate 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina  2.38 4.02  8.24 9.40 
Bolivia  0.59 1.59  4.20 5.47 
Brazil  3.09 4.61  9.12 9.78 
Chile  2.42 5.42  2.56 3.57 
Colombia  1.25 2.44  1.61 2.27 
Costa  Rica  0.09 1.55  1.52 2.83 
Dominican  Republic  0.00 3.19  1.47 2.38 
Ecuador  0.27 1.97  1.96 3.00 
Egypt  0.11 3.83  0.77 2.74 
El  Salvador  0.00 1.25  0.49 3.94 
India  0.45 2.85  1.31 2.84 
Israel  0.44 1.83  3.50 4.98 
Korea  1.13 3.08  1.06 2.59 
Malaysia  0.16 0.62  1.26 1.73 
Mexico  0.00 0.03  2.71 3.46 
Morocco  0.16 1.98  1.82 2.58 
Pakistan  0.56 3.07  0.58 2.35 
Paraguay  0.39 1.38  1.19 2.67 
Philippines  0.70 2.41  1.28 2.79 
South  Africa  0.19 1.51  2.10 5.31 
Sri  Lanka  0.22 3.62  1.54 2.33 
Thailand  0.04 0.99  0.83 2.46 
Uruguay  3.14 4.52  3.39 3.91 
Venezuela  0.24 0.33  1.89 3.34 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*  All the numbers reported in this table are expressed in percentage terms. 
 
 
  This study examines time series data from 24 developing countries for which exchange rate 
and price data are available for both BW and post-BW periods.  Data on both monthly consumer 
prices and official exchange rates were taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
database.  As studied by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), parallel market rates are from various 
issues of Pick’s Currency Yearbook and Pick’s World Currency Report (later became the World 
Currency Yearbook).  All exchange rates are expressed in units of foreign currency per U.S. 
dollar.  Dictated by data availability, the sample data cover the period January 1957 through  
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December 1998.
2  The countries under study include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Israel, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.  Even during the post-BW period, these countries chose to adopt 
official pegs or crawls (with fixed or limited flexibility in rates) against the U.S. dollar most of 
the time. 
  Unlike previous cross-regime studies, which explore the different flexibility of official rates 
between the BW and the post-BW period, this study builds on the basic premise that official 
rates are less flexible than parallel rates within the same period.  Our dual-rate analysis requires 
neither an assumption of official exchange rates being absolutely fixed over time nor an 
assumption of parallel exchange rates being entirely flexible.
3  Table 1 shows the average size 
(measured as the mean absolute change) of official and parallel rate movements over the two 
time periods.  The data are consistent with the conventional wisdom that market-determined 
parallel rates move more freely than official rates. 
    Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics showing the average size and standard deviation 
of the parallel market premium during the BW and post-BW periods.  As shown, the parallel 
market premium can vary greatly both in size and in variability across countries, even within the 
same period.  Moreover, the data reveal no systematic pattern of change in the average premium 
size across the two time periods.  The average parallel market premium rises in 9 countries but 
falls in 15 countries when moving from the BW to the post-BW period.  There is also no 
systematic pattern of cross-period change in variability, with increases for 10 countries and 
decreases for 14 countries from the BW to the post-BW period. 
                                                      
2 The World Currency Yearbook had stopped being published after 1998.  In addition, due to limited data 
availability of parallel market rates, a slightly shorter sample period that begins later than 1957 is used in the cases 
of Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Morocco, and Venezuela.  For several countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Korea, 
and Thailand), moreover, consumer price data are not available for the sample period.  In these cases, we use either 
wholesale or producer price data.   
3 Most nominal exchange rates are neither completely fixed nor completely flexible over time.  This is true for both 
the BW period and the post-BW period.  This is also true for both developing and industrial countries.  
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Table 2.  The average size and variability of the parallel market premium* 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
            Bretton Woods        Post-Bretton Woods   
Country  Mean St.  Dev.    Mean St.  Dev. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina  11.60 23.60  26.34 35.25 
Bolivia  12.83 15.91  23.50 47.61 
Brazil  10.26 14.34  21.06 21.26 
Chile  40.17 49.46  15.24 14.72 
Colombia 21.22  18.37  7.68  6.80 
Costa  Rica  20.68 11.46  13.60 12.71 
Dominican Republic  24.38  9.07  23.90  23.23 
Ecuador 15.82  7.80  19.88  21.81 
Egypt  74.99 23.84  42.39 39.10 
El Salvador  16.60  6.64  41.09  33.35 
India 38.05  15.88  12.49  7.20 
Israel 16.92  9.37  9.10  12.53 
Korea 34.94  32.38  4.40  6.52 
Malaysia  1.95 1.91  0.63 2.04 
Mexico -0.08  0.04  8.37  13.85 
Morocco 12.05  6.87  4.39  4.30 
Pakistan  54.60 18.31  12.98 10.66 
Paraguay  14.06 13.53  31.58 34.18 
Philippines 22.36  25.88  6.36  6.49 
South  Africa  6.87 4.51  9.16 9.58 
Sri  Lanka  67.59 28.46  20.34 20.13 
Thailand  1.26 2.10  0.13 3.39 
Uruguay 35.56  48.68  8.77  10.52 
Venezuela  10.41 15.55  24.69 38.72 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*  The parallel market premium is measured in percentage terms. 
 
 
  Table 3 summarizes the test results from fractional integration analysis by country.  The 
unit-root null hypothesis of d = 1 is tested against the mean-reverting alternative of d < 1.  For 
the BW period, the unit-root hypothesis can be rejected for all but one of the 24 countries at the 
5% significance level.  The post-BW data also widely reject the unit-root hypothesis.  In all but 
two cases can the unit-root hypothesis be rejected at the 5% level.  In general, the test results 
strongly support that the differential between the official and the parallel market rate is 
stationary.  Indeed, our findings suggest that these two exchange rates are fractionally  
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cointegrated – a more general notion of cointegration than what has been considered in previous 
studies (e.g., Booth and Mustafa, 1991; Kouretas and Zarangas, 1998).
4 
 
Table 3.  Testing for mean reversion in the parallel market premium* 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
        Bretton Woods   Post-Bretton  Woods 
Country  d – 1  t-stat   d – 1   t-stat 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina 0.00  (0.01)  -0.20  (-2.83)
* 
Bolivia -0.06  (-3.54)
* -0.38  (-4.21)
* 
Brazil -0.64  (-5.16)
* -0.32  (-2.94)
* 
Chile -0.06  (-1.98)
* -0.41  (-3.59)
* 
Colombia -0.35  (-10.58)
* -1.09  (-12.58)
* 
Costa Rica  -0.79  (-6.39)
* -0.23  (-3.00)
* 
Dominican Republic  -0.27  (-3.48)
* -0.99  (-6.92)
* 
Ecuador -0.30  (-4.85)
* -0.20  (-2.38)
* 
Egypt -1.16  (-5.34)
* 0.09  (1.00) 
El Salvador  -0.04  (-2.20)
* -0.12  (-1.99)
* 
India -1.06  (-7.91)
* -1.08  (-8.80)
* 
Israel -1.01  (-5.20)
* -0.09  (-1.15) 
Korea -0.84  (-42.63)
* -1.33  (-26.61)
* 
Malaysia -0.38  (-6.63)
* -1.35  (-3.43)
* 
Mexico -0.25  (-8.54)
* -0.64  (-8.62)
* 
Morocco -0.32  (-4.12)
* -1.44  (-13.10)
* 
Pakistan -1.41  (-5.97)
* -0.18  (-3.56)
* 
Paraguay -0.89  (-4.44)
* -0.44  (-4.12)
* 
Philippines -0.27  (-3.35)
* -1.10  (-12.42)
* 
South Africa  -0.94  (-6.62)
* -0.41  (-8.74)
* 
Sri Lanka  -0.08  (-2.32)
* -0.46  (-7.77)
* 
Thailand -1.26  (-7.84)
* -1.36  (-21.38)
* 
Uruguay -0.98  (-7.08)
* -0.33  (-3.82)
* 
Venezuela -1.44  (-7.71)




*  The unit-root null hypothesis of d – 1 = 0 is tested against the mean-reverting fractional alternative 
of d – 1 < 0.  The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics for the corresponding estimates.  Statistical 
significance is indicated by an asterisk ( 
* ) for the 5% level. 
 
  It should be noted that although the official and parallel exchange rates display a long-run 
stationary relationship, their short-run differential can still be large and persistent.  From an 
                                                      
4 There is a vast literature on dual exchange rates.  In addition to the long-run relationship between official and 
parallel market rates, previous studies have examined additional issues, including market efficiency, causality, 
volatility transmission, capital controls, and purchasing power parity.  We will move away from these known issues 
and explore a different issue, namely, the relative speed of real rate adjustment produced by dual exchange rates.  
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algebraic viewpoint, the parallel market premium represents the difference between the real 
parallel exchange rate (RERPt) and the real official exchange rate (REROt) during the same time 
period: 
   ePt – eOt = RERPt – REROt (9) 
where RERPt = ePt + pFt – pDt and REROt = eOt + pFt – pDt, with pFt being the U.S. price level and 
pDt being the domestic price level (in logarithms).  The short-run differential between ePt and eOt 
shows the possible difference in the dynamic behavior between the real official and the real 
parallel exchange rate. 
 
4.  Adjustment speeds of real official and parallel exchange rates 
 
  The adjustment behavior of real official and real parallel exchange rates is examined next.  
We first check the stationarity of individual real exchange rate series.  If PPP holds in the long 
run, the real official and the real parallel exchange rate should exhibit mean reversion.  In 
analyzing the adjustment behavior of real exchange rates in industrial countries, previous studies 
generally report greater difficulty in finding mean reversion in flexible-rate than in fixed-rate 
data.  In terms of historical periods, it also seems much harder to detect mean reversion during 
the post-BW period as opposed to other historical periods.  Do similar results apply to the 
behavior of real exchange rates in developing countries?  Compared to those for industrial 
countries, empirical findings for developing countries have been relatively limited and less 
extensive.  In this regard, our results from dual exchange rates in developing countries may offer 
an alternative perspective on the dynamics of real exchange rate adjustment. 
  Table 4 contains the results from tests for stationarity in real exchange rates.  For the BW 
period, the unit-root hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level in 18 out of 24 cases 
for real official rates and in 19 out of 24 cases for real parallel rates.  For the post-BW period, the 
unit-root hypothesis can be rejected in 18 out of 24 cases for real official rates and in 17 out of 
24 cases for real parallel rates.  Hence, the real official and the real parallel exchange rate show 
little difference in terms of the number of unit-root rejection cases.  In the large majority of 
cases, both real official and parallel rates exhibit mean reversion.  This applies to the BW and the 
post-BW period alike.  
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Table 4.  Testing for mean reversion in real official and parallel exchange rates+ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                             Bretton Woods     Post-Bretton  Woods   
  Real official rate Real  parallel  rate    Real official rate   Real parallel rate 
Country  d – 1   t-stat  d – 1   t-stat  d – 1  t-stat  d – 1  t-stat 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina -0.18  (-6.10)*  -0.14  (-2.05)* -0.25  (-3.08)*  -0.14  (-2.83)* 
Bolivia -0.75  (-6.88)*  -0.06  (-1.92) -0.50  (-8.63)*  -0.07  (-0.68) 
Brazil -1.21  (-8.56)*  -0.10  (-2.07)* -0.74  (-6.22)*  -0.16  (-2.90)* 
Chile  -0.95  (-4.73)*  0.05 (0.86)  0.06 (1.18)  -0.13  (-1.48) 
Colombia -0.19  (-3.31)*  -0.83  (-6.64)*  0.12  (1.71)  0.05  (0.99) 
Costa Rica  -0.04  (-0.49)  -0.85  (-8.59)* -1.02  (-5.09)*  -0.14  (-0.80) 
Dominican  Republic  -1.09  (-6.65)*  -1.02 (-7.48)*  -0.14 (-3.95)*  -0.93  (-12.62)* 
Ecuador -0.10  (-2.07)*  -0.03  (-0.73) -0.11  (-1.39)  -0.24  (-3.65)* 
Egypt  -0.82 (-5.74)*  -1.04  (-8.76)*  0.06  (0.84)  -0.20 (-3.04)* 
El  Salvador  -0.07 (-0.88)  -0.82  (-5.64)*  -0.92 (-15.97)*  -0.87 (-4.64)* 
India -0.94  (-3.53)*  -1.14  (-5.63)* -0.74  (-3.27)*  -0.73  (-3.94)* 
Israel -0.10  (-1.64)  -0.70  (-4.24)* -0.07  (-2.85)*  -0.26  (-17.18)* 
Korea -1.05  (-4.41)*  -0.92  (-9.24)* -0.95  (-7.95)*  -1.02  (-4.88)* 
Malaysia -0.78  (-4.51)*  -0.11  (-2.78)* -1.42  (-4.42)*  -0.92  (-6.75)* 
Mexico  -0.03 (-0.81)  -0.03 (-24.32)* -0.85  (-8.05)*  -0.10  (-2.22)* 
Morocco  0.04  (-0.58) -0.34  (-4.28)*  0.07  (1.39) -0.03  (-0.26) 
Pakistan  -0.03 (-3.94)*  -0.33  (-3.93)*  0.09  (1.64)  -1.17 (-7.56)* 
Paraguay  0.02 (0.57)  -0.03 (-2.28)*  -0.04 (-4.59)*  -0.02  (-17.43)* 
Philippines  -0.68 (-5.10)*  0.03  (0.58)  -0.80  (-4.07)*  -0.87 (-4.16)* 
South Africa  -0.19  (-4.12)*  -1.29  (-5.78)* -0.26  (-3.64)*  -0.19  (-4.08)* 
Sri Lanka  -0.03  (-5.43)*  -0.06  (-1.92) -0.14  (-2.40)*  -0.03  (-0.22) 
Thailand  -1.03  (-11.99)* -1.10  (-8.08)*  -0.96  (-12.34)* -1.05  (-29.30)* 
Uruguay  -1.09  (-4.96)*  -0.84 (-4.57)*  -0.75 (-7.20)*  0.04 (0.52) 
Venezuela -0.06  (-2.00)*  -0.26  (-2.97)* -0.15  (-2.89)*  -0.15  (-2.54)* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
+  The unit-root null hypothesis of d – 1 = 0 is tested against the mean-reverting fractional alternative of d – 1 < 0.  The numbers in parentheses 
are the t-statistics for the corresponding estimates.  Statistical significance is indicated by an asterisk ( 
* ) for the 5% level. 
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4.1. Intra-period comparison of adjustment speeds by country 
  
  We next evaluate how fast the real official and the real parallel exchange rate adjust to 
shocks.  To analyze whether the flexible parallel market rate produces quicker real exchange rate 
adjustment than the pegged official rate, their adjustment speeds – measured in terms of half-
lives of shocks to real exchange rates – are computed using impulse response analysis.  Based on 
the ARFIMA model, as described in (1), the half-life can be estimated from a moving average 
representation of the time series process: 
   (1  –  L)yt = A(L)vt (10) 
where A(L) = 1 + α1L + α2L
2 + α3L
3 + … derived from  
   A (L) = (1 – L)
1–dΦ(L) (11) 
with Φ(L) = B
–1(L)D(L).  The moving average coefficients {α1, α2, α3, …} are often referred to as 
impulse responses, and they track and measure how much the real exchange rate adjusts in 
subsequent periods after a unit shock.  The calculated half-life indicates how long it takes for the 
impact of a unit shock to the real exchange rate to dissipate by half. 
  The question at issue is whether greater exchange rate flexibility facilitates real exchange 
rate adjustment.  The conventional argument is that, in a world of sticky prices, the speed at 
which the real exchange rate adjusts should depend a lot on exchange rate flexibility.  Under 
pegged exchange rates, real exchange rates are expected to adjust at a slow pace limited by price 
stickiness.  Although exchange rate realignments may sometimes hasten adjustment, they occur 
infrequently.  With flexible exchange rates, on the other hand, real exchange rates can adjust 
quickly through immediate changes in nominal exchange rates.  Despite the intuitive appeal of 
this argument, verifying its empirical validity is not clear-cut in general.  The usual approach is 
to analyze the difference in real exchange rate behavior between fixed-rate and flexible-rate 
regimes over different historical periods.  Apart from the possible issue in exchange rate regime 
classifications (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), the cross-regime/cross-period comparison presents 
another problem, namely that different historical periods can have different global and domestic 
conditions that can alter real exchange rate behavior. 
  In our analysis of dual exchange rates, the adjustment speed of the real official exchange 
rate is compared to that of the real parallel exchange rate over the same time period.  If nominal 
exchange rate flexibility aids real exchange rate adjustment, the flexible parallel market rate  
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should yield a faster speed of real exchange rate adjustment than does the inflexible official rate.  
To the extent that the speeds of real official and parallel rates are compared over the same period 
for the same country, the intra-period country-by-country comparison averts the need to control 
for economic conditions. 
 
Table 5.  Estimates of adjustment speeds for real official and parallel rates* 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Bretton Woods                 Post-Bretton Woods   
  Real official rate Real  parallel  rate  Real official rate Real  parallel  rate 
Country  Half-life   Half-life  Half-life    Half-life 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina 13.97  9.86  1.29  5.31 
Bolivia 5.16  100+  0.15  0.11 
Brazil 0.61  35.30  2.08  4.88 
Chile 0.73  ∞  ∞ 100+ 
Colombia 6.25  1.12  ∞  ∞ 
Costa Rica  100+  1.95  0.57  80.51 
Dominican Republic  0.69  0.44  7.02  2.84 
Ecuador 58.83  100+  34.52  13.61 
Egypt 2.56  0.48  ∞ 1.04 
El Salvador  34.33  1.91  0.64  1.37 
India 1.16  0.57  2.27  1.48 
Israel 34.61  1.73  46.33  0.50 
Korea 1.06  1.76  1.52  0.91 
Malaysia 2.07  23.56  1.22  1.45 
Mexico 100+  100+  2.65  59.28 
Morocco  ∞ 0.73  ∞ 100+ 
Pakistan 100+  0.71  ∞ 0.32 
Paraguay 100+      100+  100+  100+ 
Philippines 1.58  ∞ 1.89  1.11 
South Africa  1.60  0.39  5.70  1.80 
Sri Lanka  100+  100+  4.27  100+ 
Thailand 0.73  0.64  1.49  0.70 
Uruguay 0.46  1.07  4.60  ∞ 
Venezuela 100+  2.09  4.61  100+ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*  All half-life estimates are expressed in years.  For half-life estimates that are longer than 100 years, 
they are indicated by “100+” in the table.  In cases in which the real exchange rate process yields an 
estimated integration order greater than one (i.e., d > 1), it is indicated by “∞” and considered as having 
an infinite half-life. 
 
  Table 5 presents the half-life estimates for both real official and parallel exchange rates of 
individual countries.  Evidently, the empirical results show no systematic pattern for the country  
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group as a whole.  While the estimated half-life of the real parallel rate can differ significantly 
from that of the real official rate in a given country, there is no identifiable general pattern in the 
half-life difference between the two real rates.  Interestingly, real parallel rates appear as likely to 
yield a shorter half-life as real official rates.  In about half of the cases, real parallel rates may 
actually adjust more slowly rather than more quickly in comparison to real official rates.  
Qualitatively similar findings are obtained, regardless of whether the BW or the post-BW period 
is considered.  Overall, there is no consistent evidence to support that greater exchange rate 
flexibility tend to generate faster or slower real exchange rate adjustment. 
  The foregoing analysis has been based on point estimates of half-lives.  As discussed later, 
some recent studies (Cheung and Lai, 2000; Murray and Papell, 2002) investigate the potential 
uncertainty in estimating half-lives of real exchange rates.  The allowance for uncertain half-life 
measurements will further reinforce our conclusion that there is little evidence of any systematic 
relationship between nominal exchange rate flexibility and the speed of real exchange rate 
adjustment. 
 
4.2. Departures from consensus estimates 
 
  Previous studies of real exchange rates typically report slow adjustment speeds with half-
lives estimated to be 3 to 5 years.  Describing the “consensus” on half-life estimates as 
remarkable and puzzling, Rogoff (1996) points out the difficulty in reconciling the slow 
adjustment speed of real exchange rates with their immense short-term volatility.  Although 
standard exchange rate models with sticky prices may account for the huge short-term volatility 
under monetary shocks, the consensus half-life estimates are, as Rogoff (1996) notes, still too 
slow to be explained by nominal rigidities.  On the other hand, the slow adjustment speed may 
reflect the influence of real shocks.  If real shocks are predominant, they can exert significant 
long-lasting effects on the real exchange rate.  Nevertheless, existing models based on real 
shocks cannot account for short-term exchange rate volatility. 
  The remarkable consensus highlighted by Rogoff (1996) comes mainly from real exchange 
rate studies of industrial countries.  Departing from the consensus range, the half-life estimates 
obtained from the study here are much more dispersed.  As shown in figure 1, the half-life 
estimates for both real official and parallel exchange rates show substantial variation among the 
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Figure 1. Cross-country differences in half-life estimates 
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 developing countries under study.  In a large majority of cases, these half-life estimates fall far 
outside Rogoff’s (1996) consensus range of 3-5 years.  Indeed, the half-life estimates are as 
likely to be higher as to be lower than the previous consensus estimates.  This applies to the BW 
and the post-BW period alike.  For the BW period, the estimated half-lives of the real official 
and parallel rates are shorter than 2 years in 9 to 13 cases and longer than 6 years in 10 to 13 
cases.  For the post-BW period, the estimated half-lives of the real official and parallel rates are 
less than 2 years in 7 to 11 cases and more than 6 years in 9 to 10 cases. 
  All in all, the half-life consensus reported among previous studies on real exchange rates in 
industrial countries fails to prevail among developing countries, which display much greater 
heterogeneity.  For a number of developing countries, the results may seem consistent with 
relatively fast adjustment speeds as suggested by sticky-price models.  For other developing 
countries, the data may yield sluggish rates of real exchange rate adjustment that are so slow that 
there is little long-run reversion.  These findings are robust with respect to whether the real 
official or the real parallel exchange rate is considered. 
 
4.3. Increased uncertainty in adjustment speed measurements 
 
  In analyzing the speed of real exchange rate adjustment during the post-BW period, Cheung 
and Lai (2000) evaluate the sample half-life measure and its estimation accuracy.  To quantify 
the inevitable imprecision with which the adjustment speed is estimated, confidence intervals for 
half-life estimates are computed for several major industrial countries.  These confidence 
intervals are found to be wide, indicating a high level of uncertainty in measuring the half-life of 
real exchange rate adjustment.  The lower-bound estimates generally come in with half-lives less 
than 2 years, but the upper-bound estimates contain half-lives that last 7 to 9 years.  Murray and 
Papell (2002) examine the post-BW data from 20 industrial countries and find even greater 
uncertainty in half-life measurements.  While the lower-end estimates can reach as low as just 
one year, the higher-end estimates are often infinitely large. 
  In this study we provide alternative evidence from the experience of developing countries 
with dual exchange rates over both the BW and post-BW periods.  To explore whether the 
previous results on uncertain half-lives may similarly be observed in the data for developing 
countries, the 95% confidence interval for each individual half-life measurement is computed by 
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Table 6.  Sampling uncertainty in half-life estimates* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                           Bretton Woods     Post-Bretton  Woods   
  Real official rate Real  parallel  rate    Real official rate Real  parallel  rate 
Country  LB95%  UB95%   LB95%  UB95%   LB95%  UB95%   LB95%  UB95%   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina [0.39,  ∞ ]  [0.71,  100+]  [0.31,  17.94]  [0.31,  100+] 
Bolivia [0.63,  5.60]  [0.99,  ∞ ]  [0.10,  0.25]  [0.08,  ∞ ] 
Brazil [0.30,  0.71]  [0.51,  100+]  [0.79,  17.07]  [0.45,  100+] 
Chile [0.32,  0.81]  [33.32,  ∞ ]  [100+,  ∞ ]  [0.89,  ∞ ] 
Colombia [0.37,  100+]  [0.65,  2.10]  [3.78,  ∞ ]  [100+,  ∞ ] 
Costa Rica  [1.75,  100+]  [1.19,  2.38]  [0.23,  4.03]  [1.07,  100+] 
Dominican  Republic  [0.24, 0.85]  [0.24, 0.53]  [0.55,  100+]  [0.94, 12.30] 
Ecuador [0.55,  100+]  [1.71,  ∞ ]  [0.36,  ∞ ]  [0.99,  100+] 
Egypt  [0.80, 3.18]  [0.23, 0.64]  [0.63,  ∞ ]  [0.23,  12.98] 
El Salvador  [0.17,  ∞ ]  [0.62,  2.15]  [0.39,  3.46]  [0.40,  100+] 
India  [0.42, 1.24]  [0.33, 0.58]  [0.99, 9.93]  [0.61,  4.07] 
Israel [0.50,  ∞] [0.46,  2.40]  [1.41,  100+] [0.18,  1.78] 
Korea  [0.44, 1.09]  [0.63, 2.14]  [0.59, 6.37]  [0.49,  3.62] 
Malaysia [0.66,  2.54]  [0.47,  100+]  [1.07,  8.45]  [0.67,  12.18] 
Mexico [1.47,  ∞ ]  [1.47,  ∞ ]  [1.02,  53.96]  [0.95,  100+] 
Morocco [100+,  ∞ ]  [0.22,  3.67]  [100+,  ∞ ]  [0.63,  ∞ ] 
Pakistan [1.46,  ∞ ]  [0.24,  6.88]  [100+,  ∞ ]  [0.18,  12.09] 
Paraguay [7.21,  ∞ ]  [1.64,  ∞ ]  [2.87,  ∞ ]  [6.93,  ∞ ] 
Philippines [0.77,  3.04]  [11.13,  ∞ ]  [0.57,  12.58]  [0.46,  3.95] 
South Africa  [0.23,  86.31]  [0.27,  0.42]  [0.78,  100+]  [0.31,  23.29] 
Sri Lanka  [1.72,  ∞ ]  [0.87,  ∞ ]  [0.23,  100+]  [1.20,  ∞ ] 
Thailand  [0.41, 0.98]  [0.48, 1.06]  [0.69, 6.70]  [0.35, 32.61] 
Uruguay  [0.24, 0.50]  [0.41, 1.26]  [1.23,  21.48]  [2.81,  ∞ ] 
Venezuela [0.88,  ∞ ]  [0.35,  41.25]  [0.48,  100+]  [1.91,  ∞ ] 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* All half-life estimates are expressed in years.  For half-life estimates that are longer than 100 years, they are indicated by “100+” in the table.  
[LB95%, UB95%] indicates the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval for the corresponding half-life estimate.  
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Monte Carlo simulation.  Using the estimated ARFIMA process for the respective data series as 
the data generating process, the half-life confidence interval is constructed based on 10,000 
simulation replications in each case. 
  Table 6 gives the lower and upper bounds (denoted respectively by LB95% and UB95%) of the 
half-life confidence interval.  According to the lower-bound estimates, most half-lives can be as 
short as within a year for both real official and parallel rates.  The upper-bound estimates of half-
lives, in contrast, show no general pattern.  Unlike those estimates previously reported for 
industrial countries (Cheung and Lai, 2000; Murray and Papell, 2002), these upper-bound half-
life estimates vary widely among developing countries, ranging from less than a year to infinitely 
many years. 
  A closer examination of our results suggests a possible difference in pattern between the 
BW and the post-BW period.  Figure 2 summarizes the results on half-life uncertainty by looking 
at the relative width of half-life confidence intervals for each historical period.  The interval 
width, which is the difference between UB95% and LB95%, shows the level of uncertainty in 
estimating the half-life.  A wider (narrower) confidence interval indicates greater (lesser) 
uncertainty.  Compared to those for the BW period, the half-life confidence intervals for the 
post-BW period are more likely to be wider than to be narrower.  This observed pattern holds for 
both real official and parallel exchange rates.  For the post-BW data, in only one out of the 24 
cases can the width of the half-life confidence interval be shorter than 3 years.  For the BW data, 
in contrast, the width of the confidence interval can be less than 3 years in at least 10 cases. 
  The foregoing results raise interesting questions about the source of the increased 
uncertainty in measuring real exchange rate adjustment speeds.  In our study, the post-BW 
sample period yields a larger number of observations than the BW sample period does.  
Although the width of the confidence interval depends partly on the sample size, the difference 
in sample size cannot account for the observed difference in the interval width between the two 
historical periods.  For a given confidence level, the width of the confidence interval decreases, 
not increases, as the sample size grows.  All else being equal, we should actually expect to see 
lower measurement uncertainty for the post-BW data than for the BW data.  The empirical 
evidence shows just the opposite.  Accordingly, the increased uncertainty may reflect the 
difference in variability of shocks rather than the difference in sample size.  This suggests that 
some not yet identified factors can be responsible for the increased uncertainty in measuring real 
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Figure 2.  Cross-country variation in the uncertainty in half-life estimation 
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 exchange rate adjustment speeds during the post-BW period.  This poses an interesting issue for 
future research. 
 
5. Further analysis of the cross-country variation in adjustment speeds 
 
  With the estimated half-life of the real exchange rate varying greatly from country to 
country, it is instructive to investigate how much the observed cross-country variation is 
ascribable to inter-country differences in structural economic characteristics.  We will examine 
several key country characteristics that have been identified in the literature as possible factors 
influencing real exchange rate dynamics.  The first structural characteristic is the country’s 
openness to trade.  A basic element of the PPP adjustment process is that goods market arbitrage 
affects trade flows and induces real exchange rate adjustment.  To ascertain whether openness to 
trade facilitates real exchange rate adjustment, the degree of trade openness is measured by the 
ratio of total trade (imports plus exports) to the country’s GDP. 
  The second structural characteristic under study is the country’s productivity growth.  This 
supply-side factor is the focus of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, which posits that 
productivity growth can induce sustained changes in real exchange rates due to its differential 
impact on the prices of traded and non-traded goods (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964).  
Empirical evidence for the hypothesis has been presented by, e.g., Canzoneri et al. (1999) and 
Chinn and Johnston (1999) based on OECD data. 
  Money growth is another country characteristic to be explored.  A country’s money growth 
rate is an indicator for the general stance of monetary policy:  A lower (higher) rate of money 
growth means a tighter (easier) monetary policy.  Unlike productivity changes, which are a 
source of real shocks, money supply changes represent monetary shocks.  If nominal exchange 
rate and price changes are dominated by monetary rather than real shocks, real exchange rates 
are expected to adjust relatively fast.  It is thus interesting to see if there is any significant 
negative relationship between half-lives of real exchange rates and money growth rates across 
countries. 
    The fourth country characteristic under consideration is government spending, a demand-
side factor included in some structural models of real exchange rates (e.g., Frenkel and Razin, 
1996; Froot and Rogoff, 1991, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).  Unlike private spending,  
  - 21 -
government spending tends to fall more heavily on non-traded goods.  Consequently, 
government spending can affect the relative demand for – and thus the relative price of – traded 
and non-traded goods.  Balvers and Bergstrand (2002) also highlight the complementarity of 
private and government consumption as an important channel through which government 
spending can influence the equilibrium real exchange rate.  In addition to short-run effects, 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) show that government spending, if financed by distortionary taxes, 
can have long-run real effects.  De Gregorio et al. (1994) examine panel data from OECD 
countries and report empirical evidence in support of a positive relationship between government 
spending and the relative price of traded and non-traded goods.  Chinn and Johnston (1999) also 
find significant evidence from OECD data that government spending affects real exchange rates. 
      Table 7 shows the differences among the 24 developing countries in terms of structural 
economic characteristics.  The trade openness variable represents the average ratio of total trade 
to GDP over the relevant sample period.  For the productivity growth variable, the average 
annual rate of growth in real per capita GDP over the sample period is used as a broad proxy.  
The money growth variable measures the average annual rate of quasi money (M2) growth 
(adjusted for real GDP growth) over the sample period.  The G/GDP growth variable gives the 
average annual rate of growth in government spending as a share of GDP over the sample period.  
In general, the cross-country data display huge variability in structural economic characteristics 
among the developing countries under study. 
  An inspection of the cross-country variation in either adjustment speeds or structural 
characteristics suggests that the usual distributional assumption on normality is not tenable for 
these data.  This calls for the use of nonparametric methods in our statistical analysis.  We first 
employ Spearman’s rank correlation analysis to gauge the strength (and direction) of the 
relationship between the half-life of the real exchange rate and each structural economic variable.  
The rank correlation method makes no assumptions about the data distribution, and it does not 
require the underlying relationship between the variables to be linear.
5  The rank-based method 
also works well when the data are not given in precise sample values. 
  To implement the Spearman analysis, all the observations are ranked from the smallest to
                                                      
5 The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, which is the standard correlation statistic, measures how well 
a linear equation describes the relation between two variables.  The Spearman rank correlation coefficient, in 
contrast, measures how well an arbitrary monotonic function can describe the relationship between two variables.  
The monotonic function can be nonlinear.  
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Table 7.  Cross-country differences in structural economic characteristics 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                 Bretton Woods     Post-Bretton  Woods   
 Trade  Productivity  Money  G/GDP  Trade  Productivity  Money  G/GDP   
Country openness  growth  growth  growth openness  growth  growth  growth 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina 22.05  14.93  18.22  -10.59  17.32  0.16  183.55  -1.21 
Bolivia  43.58 3.25  22.45 1.70  47.70 0.13  94.72 1.35 
Brazil  13.57 6.03  43.28  -1.33  17.65 1.52  266.31 3.01 
Chile  74.31  13.86  42.38 3.22  52.73 2.95  46.45  -1.30 
Colombia  27.37 3.94  19.56 3.47  31.22 1.69  34.29 3.57 
Costa  Rica  54.74 3.16 7.93 2.90  73.87 1.24  25.53  -0.41 
Dominican  Republic  39.62  2.72 14.66 -2.81 64.02  1.97 17.29 -0.88 
Ecuador  35.54  2.95 10.50 -0.97 52.53  0.92 10.23 -0.09 
Egypt 37.84  N.A.  N.A.  3.27  53.13  2.75  14.75  -3.45 
El  Salvador  51.78 2.32 7.66 0.06  57.62 0.41  10.95  -0.45 
India  10.60 1.46 9.80 1.99  16.60 2.72  14.84 1.54 
Israel  65.06 4.61 0.71 4.56  91.06 2.10  61.91  -1.36 
Korea  26.68  4.51 42.07 -0.69 68.59  5.76 15.04  0.59 
Malaysia  87.13 7.01  11.50 1.96  130.66 3.97 9.95  -1.87 
Mexico  20.59 3.32 9.46 4.43  34.16 1.21  38.72 0.54 
Morocco  42.52 1.22 9.72 0.13  50.04 1.52  14.67 1.70 
Pakistan  20.62 1.12  14.37 2.45  33.81 2.37  12.71 0.57 
Paraguay  30.80 1.89  24.79 0.17  54.74 1.53  22.47 1.70 
Philippines  30.23 1.78  10.91 1.51  59.56 0.62  19.25 1.66 
South  Africa 52.29 2.19 6.55 2.15  50.56  -0.40  11.81 1.74 
Sri  Lanka  54.02 3.96 7.14  -0.45  70.60 3.76  17.70  -0.70 
Thailand  37.48 4.24  15.02 1.43  63.38 4.85  12.44 0.70 
Uruguay  26.35  -0.24  35.45 1.51  39.70 2.18  63.65  -0.74 
Venezuela  48.52 2.05 7.75 0.25  53.25  -0.37  26.22  -1.70 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All the above numbers are given in percent per year, and they represent average values over the corresponding sample period. 
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 the largest for each data series.  In case when a tie in rank occurs, the observations involved are 
assigned the average value of the ranks they would receive as if they were in successive order.  
Considering a pair of variables, say (x1, x2), the rank correlation statistic (denoted by ρ) is given 
by 
   ρ  = 1 – 
) 1 (













where N is the number of observations for each variable, R(x1j) is the rank order of the jth 
observation of variable x1, and R(x2j) is the rank order of the jth observation of variable x2.  The 
null hypothesis of ρ = 0 (i.e., of no correlation between the two variables) can be tested against 
the alternative hypothesis of ρ ≠ 0.  Based on the rank correlation estimates (not reported but 
available upon request), little correlation could be found in all but one case.  In the exception 
case, a significantly negative correlation was found between the money growth rate and the half-
life of the real official exchange rate.  In all the other cases, the correlation estimates were either 
statistically insignificant or having ambiguous signs or both. 
  A more formal analysis of the cross-country data is performed using the multiple rank 
regression method.  Similar to rank correlation analysis, rank regression analysis is based on the 
rank-ordered data instead of the original data.  The regression equation includes the various 
economic factors as explanatory variables: 
   HLj = ζ0 + ζ1OPENj + ζ2PRODj + ζ3GOVTj + ζ4MONEYj  j = 1, 2, …, N (13) 
where HL is the half-life of the real exchange rate of the corresponding country, OPEN is the 
trade openness of the respective economy, PROD is the country’s average productivity growth 
rate, GOVT is the average increase in government spending as a share of the country’s GDP, and 
MONEY is the average money growth rate (adjusted for real GDP growth) in the respective 
country. 
  Table 8 contains the results from rank regression analysis, and they are largely consistent 
with those from rank correlation analysis.  The coefficients on the variables of trade openness, 
productivity growth, and government spending are all found to be statistically insignificant.  
Some of these coefficients may even have an ambiguous sign.  For the money growth variable, 
the coefficient is statistically significant in the case involving the real official exchange rate.  The 
negative coefficient in this case suggests that countries with higher money growth rates tend to  
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have faster speeds of real exchange rate adjustment.
6   However, this finding does not apply to 
the real parallel exchange rate, which yields a money growth coefficient of an incorrect sign, 
though it is statistically insignificant.  In addition to the separate regressions conducted for the 
BW and the post-BW period, regressions were also run using pooled data from both BW and 
post-BW periods together, with a time-period dummy being included as well.  Qualitatively 
similar results were obtained from the pooled data that only the money growth coefficient was 
found to be statistically significant. 
 
Table 8.  Multiple rank regression analysis of the cross-country differences in adjustment speeds 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Bretton Woods                 Post-Bretton Woods   




Trade Openness  -0.077  0.148  -0.347  -0.089 
    (0.218) (0.261)  (0.257) (0.263) 
 
Productivity Growth  -0.007  0.255  0.237  -0.038 
    (0.203) (0.243)  (0.229) (0.235) 
 
Government Spending  0.011  -0.032  -0.075  0.038 
    (0.188) (0.225)  (0.241) (0.247) 
 
Money  Growth  -0.666 0.187  -0.125 0.217 
   (0.216)




2    0.411 0.144  0.118 0.079 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The dependent variable is the adjustment speed measured in terms of the half-life of the real exchange 
rate.  Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses.  Statistical significance is 
indicated by an asterisk ( 
* ) for the 5% level. 
 
 
  In summary, the estimates of real exchange rate adjustment speeds show substantial 
variation across developing countries.  These different speed estimates are generally found to 
differ from Rogoff’s (1996) range of consensus estimates identified for industrial countries.  
                                                      
6 The negative relationship found between the adjustment speed and the rate of money growth is consistent with 
previously reported findings that PPP holds particularly well for economies with high inflation rates (e.g., McNown 
and Wallace, 1989).  
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Although the cross-country variation can be partially attributed to inter-country differences in 
money growth, much of the heterogeneity remains unaccounted for.  This is certainly an area that 
warrants additional investigation in future research.
7 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
  A longstanding issue in exchange rate economics concerns whether greater exchange rate 
flexibility promotes real exchange rate adjustment.  The latter represents an important channel 
through which an open economy adjusts to disturbances.  Some economists consider nominal 
exchange rate flexibility to be important for macroeconomic adjustment by accelerating the 
realignment of the real exchange rate, while others hold the opposing view that free exchange 
rate movement may actually disrupt and prolong the real exchange rate adjustment process. 
  Instead of relying on inter-period comparisons of different exchange rate regimes, as 
previous studies of industrial countries have done, this study examines intra-period data on 
official and parallel exchange rates from developing countries.  Specifically, it analyzes whether 
the flexible parallel market rate implies a faster speed of real exchange rate adjustment than the 
much less flexible official rate does.  The use of the intra-period data on dual exchange rates 
averts the usual need to control for inter-period differences in economic conditions.  With the 
official and parallel rates operating under same economic conditions, there is no significant 
evidence that greater exchange rate flexibility tends to produce faster or slower real exchange 
rate adjustment, although there is substantial heterogeneity in adjustment speed estimates across 
countries.  In other words, based on the information from dual exchange rates, no systematic 
relationship can be found between nominal exchange rate flexibility and the speed of real 
exchange rate adjustment.  The result holds for both the BW and the post-BW data. 
  Many developing countries have used parallel exchange markets as a tool to adjust to 
economic shocks and external imbalances.  When official exchange rate adjustment is limited, 
changes in real exchange rates need to come mainly through price changes.  In these countries 
where an official peg to the dollar is adopted, the presence of an active parallel exchange market 
offers a back-door channel that may help facilitate real exchange rate adjustment.  Although 
                                                      
7 A new study by Benigno (2004) illustrates how a country’s choice of monetary policy rules may influence real 
exchange rate persistence.  
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parallel exchange rates can move much more freely than official rates, parallel rate movements 
are, in most cases, not found to generate faster real exchange rate adjustment. 
  A final remark about the scope of our analysis is in order.  The central question we 
examined is:  If exchange rates were operating under same economic conditions, would a more 
flexible rate generally produce faster or slower real rate adjustment than a less flexible rate?  We 
did not attempt to make any general inferences about the difference in the speed of real exchange 
adjustment between economies with fixed exchange rates and those with floating rates.  
Countries with different exchange rate systems usually differ considerably in economic 
conditions, which can cause different real exchange rate dynamics.  Even among economies with 
a similar exchange rate system, there can be substantial variation in real exchange rate 
adjustment behavior.  The developing countries examined in this study are characterized as 
having largely a fixed exchange rate under the official IMF classification, and yet these countries 
still yield a wide range of speed estimates for real exchange rate adjustment.  Moreover, the de 
facto exchange rate regime can be very different from the officially stated regime.  Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) observe that, when a parallel exchange market exists, a regime of an official peg 
might easily turn out to be a de facto float or a crawling band.  All these empirical issues make a 
general determination of the regime effect rather difficult.  This goes back to the reason why we 
do not analyze exchange rate flexibility in broader terms of exchange rate regimes (floating-rate 
regimes as opposed to fixed-rate regimes), but in more specific terms of dual exchange rates 
(market-determined parallel rates as opposed to pegged official rates).  The latter approach 
provides a more controlled study of the adjustment dynamics of exchange rates with different 
flexibility.  
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